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COMPLETE LIST OF ALL PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
Angel Investors, LLC is unaware of any parties other than those identified in the
caption of this Opening Brief of Appellant.
L

The Appellant, Angel Investors, LLC, shall be referred to herein as
"Angel."

2.

The Appellee, XanGo, LLC, shall be referred to herein as "KanCo."
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Supi

V'tion over this appeal pursuant •
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^n

§ 78-2-2(3)0).
STATEMENT O F THE ISSUES
Issue 1. via uie u..
Utah R. Civ,. P. I2(b)( I) withoi if fin ;( allowing Appellant to conduct discovery, when the
;

*, .!).. .; i ourt considered al I, idavits of other members of the limited liability company in

support of the motion to dismiss w nu .
discovery?
Standard of Review: A dismissal pursuant t<

]

" r"

p

'llUu

]xr

or lack of

subject matter jurisdiction is reviewed for correctness. Canjleld \. Lay ton c '//>, -005 UT
60, Tf 6

' " " ' i ^ p " ! , ) . " ^ ' Imi'.di* 0- ,!.-' HhthMis, such as subject matter
for correctness."); see U.S. West, inc. v. Tristan^ 182 F.3d

1202, 1206 (10th Cm 1999) (review of a Fed. R. Civ. P. I 2 ( b n , , dismissal for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction is de novo). 1 r - = p. rposes of ruling on a motion to dismiss for
i

u< rations « me i ompu:!;;

1

The language of Rulr I ^ ii d '• .i -. «• rules is nearly identical to the Utah M U
State v. All Real Property, Residence, <& Appurtenances, 2005 UT 90, )\ 10 n I ! r ' I1 M
693; Utah R. Civ. P. 12, Compiler's Notes. Reliance on cases interpreting the federal
rules is appropriate where the Utah and federal rules are "substantially similar.11 Tucker v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 54, <\\ 7 n.2, 53 P.3d 947.
I

and must construe the complaint in favor of the plaintiff. See Moseke v. Miller & Smith,
Inc., 202 F. Supp. 2d 492 (D.C. Va. 2002).
Preservation of Issue Below: This issue was addressed by the district court in its
December 21, 2007 Ruling. See R.356 at 3-4, 6.
Issue 2: Did the District Court err in granting the motion to dismiss pursuant to Utah R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(1) based on its determination that the Appellant lacked standing as an
inadequate representative under Utah R. Civ. P. 23.1 and could not proceed as a class of
one, when other members of the limited liability company signed affidavits that did not
challenge the allegations of malfeasance but rather stated the members preferred the
company not be involved in the derivative lawsuit?
Standard of Review: A dismissal pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction is reviewed for correctness. See Canfield, 2005 UT 60, ^[ 6 n. I,
TJ 10; Tristani, 182 F.3 at 1206. Jurisdictional questions are reviewed for correctness,
Canfield, 2005 UT 60, \ 10, and standing is a jurisdictional requirement. Jones v.
Barlow, 2007 UT 20, U 12, 154 P.3d 808.
Although any factual findings that bear on the issue will be reviewed with some
deference, the question of whether a given individual or association has standing to
request a particular relief is primarily a question of law. Le Vanger v. Highland Estates
Properties Owners Assoc., 2003 UT App. 377, ^| 8, 80 P.3d 569 (addressing standing in a
derivative action under Utah R. Civ. P. 23.1).

?

Preservation of Issue Below: This issue was addressed by the district court in its
December 21, 2007 Ruling. See R.356 at 4-12.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES, AND RULES
UtahR. Civ. P. 23.1:2
DERIVATIVE ACTIONS BY SHAREHOLDERS
In a derivative action brought by one or more shareholders or members to enforce a right
of a corporation or of an unincorporated association, the coq^oration or association having
failed to enforce a right which may properly be asserted by it, the complaint shall be
verified and shall allege (I) that the plaintiff was a shareholder or member at the time of
the transaction of which he complains or that his share or membership thereafter devolved
on him by operation of law, and (2) that the action is not a collusive one to confer
jurisdiction on a court of the United States which it would not otherwise have. The
complaint shall also allege with particularity the efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to
obtain the action he desires from the directors or comparable authority and, if necessary,
from the shareholders or members, and the reasons for his failure to obtain the action or
for not making the effort. The derivative action may not be maintained if it appears that
the plaintiff does not fairly and adequately represent the interests of the shareholders or
members similarly situated in enforcing the right of the coiporation or association. The
action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court, and
notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to shareholders or
members in such manner as the court directs.
Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-1701:
Right of action
A member may bring an action in the right of a company to recover a judgment in its
favor:

2

Utah R. Civ. P. 23.1 was amended effective November I, 2007,and is nowreorganized and renumbered as Utah R. Civ. P. 23 A. Rule 23A is substantively identical
to the original Rule 23.1. Because Rule 23.1 is the Rule relied upon below by the parties
and the district court, this appeal will also refer to Rule 23.1 rather than Rule 23 A.
3

(1) if the managers or, if no managers, the members with authority to do so have refused
to bring the action and the decision of the managers or members not to sue constitutes an
abuse of discretion or involves a conflict of interest that prevents an unbiased exercise of
judgment; or
(2) if an effort to cause those managers or members to bring the action is not likely to
succeed.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, Disposition in Court Below:
This case centers on the right of Appellant Angel Investors, LLC (''Anger1) to
bring a derivative suit pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 23.1 and Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-1701
on behalf of XanGo, LLC ("XanGo") against the majority members of XanGo (the
"Defendants").
In May 2007, Angel made several written requests, both to counsel for XanGo and
the Defendants, that XanGo pursue claims against the managing members of XanGo.
When these attempts proved unsuccessful, Angel filed a Complaint in June 2007,
bringing a derivative action on behalf of XanGo against Defendants. See R. 14.
The next month, in July 2007, Defendants filed a motion pursuant to Utah R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(1) to dismiss the derivative action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See
R. 18. The motion was supported by the affidavits of 19 XanGo members. See R. 144.
Angel opposed this motion. See R.238. Angel's opposition was supported by
declarations of counsel and Stephen Bean. See R. 158,213,216,238. Angel also filed a
Rule 56f affidavit requesting time to conduct discovery. See R.238. In addition, Angel
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filed a motion to strike portions of the 19 affidavits submitted by Defendants. See R. 147;
154. Defendants responded by filing a motion to strike portions of the Bean declaration.
SeeR.263;270.
The district court heard oral arguments on these motions in October 2007, see R.
360, and on December 2 I, 2007, the court issued its Ruling. See R.356; 359 (Addendum
A). In its Ruling, the district court granted in part and denied in part Angel's motion to
strike portions of the 19 member affidavits and granted Defendants' motion to strike
portions of the Bean declaration. See id. The district court also denied Angel's request
for time to conduct discovery and granted Defendant's motion to dismiss the derivative
suit. See id.
Statement of Facts:
Angel is a limited liability company doing business in the State of Utah. R. 14 at
\ 2. XanGo is also a Utah limited liability company, R. 14 at \ 3, whose meteoric success
as a multilevel marketing company is paralleled only by the extravagance of its six
founding members who controlled 86 percent of the company as of September 30, 2006,
see R.238 at vi; Addendum E at^j 12.
To raise money in the early days of the business, the founding members sold
minority interests to other entities and individuals, and Angel alleges that it became a

5

member of XanGo when it invested money in connection with the formation of XanGo.3
Id. at iv. The remaining 14 percent of XanGo not owned by the controlling members is
owned by the minority investors, whose respective ownership percentages range from . 10
percent to 3.3 percent. Addendum E at ^f 12. Appellant Angel Investors owns at most
one percent of the company.
When some minority investors began to question the extravagant salaries,
distributionsm and benefits paid to the founding members, XanGo's founding members
began buying minority interests from the original investors. Rather than having these
interests acquired by the LLC, thus benefitting all interest holders, XanGo gave or loaned
money to the founding members to acquire the minority interests. See Addendum E at
Tfl[ 12-13; R. 14; R.238. The result of these actions was the misuse of a company
opportunity and the misuse of LLC funds to increase the holdings of the founding
members at the expense of the LLC and the minority interest holders. See R. 14; R.238.
As a result of these concerns, among others, Angel sued XanGo directly. The
direct action ("Direct Lawsuit") is currently pending before Judge Fred Howard of the
Fourth District Court. See Angel Investors, LLC v. XanGo, LLC, Civil No. 060402848.
In the Direct Lawsuit, Angel alleges, inter alia, that XanGo has denied Angel the ability
and right to inspect XanGo's financial records, that the founding members have engaged

3

In both the Direct Lawsuit and the derivative suit, the district court has refused to
make a finding as to whether Angel is a member of XanGo, ruling there are factual
disputes regarding this issue. See R.356 at 6 (Addendum A).
6

in oppressive conduct against Angel, and have otherwise mismanaged and wasted
corporate assets. Id. The Direct Lawsuit includes a claim for judicial dissolution
pursuant to Utah Code Ami. § 48-2c-l2l0(2)(b). Id
The complaint in the Direct Lawsuit was filed by former counsel for Angel. When
Angel changed counsel, it was recognized that the fiduciary claim alleged in the Direct
Lawsuit should have been brought as a derivative claim. See R.238 at iii-iv. As a result, in
May 2007, counsel for Angel wrote the registered agent of XanGo, Mr. A. Craig Hale,
requesting that XanGo pursue claims against the managing members of XanGo, including
but not limited to, Aaron Garrity, Gary Hollister, Gordon Morton, Joseph Morton, Kent
Wood, and Bryan Davis. The letter set forth the basis of the proposed lawsuit. (A copy
of that letter was attached to the Complaint as Exhibit A.) The only response which
counsel for Angel received was a letter by which Mr. Hale asserted that he had no need to
respond to the demand to institute action for 90 days, under the Utah Revised Business
Corporations Act. (A copy of Mr. Hale's letter was attached to the Complaint as Exhibit
B.)
In addition, Mr. Brad Johnson, a member of Angel, sent a letter to each of the
Defendants demanding that they pursue the claims which are now incorporated in the
derivative suit. Angel received no response to this demand. (A copy of Mr. Johnson's
letter was attached to the Complaint as Exhibit C.)

7

Counsel for Angel also made a demand on counsel for XanGo, Mr. Robert S.
Clark and Mr. David C. Reymann, both orally and in writing, requesting that they permit
the amendment of the Direct Lawsuit to permit the pursuit of these derivative claims in
that direct suit. Counsel for XanGo either ignored or refused such requests. R. 14 at ^f 12.
After these efforts proved unsuccessful, in June 2007, Angel filed a Complaint
bringing a derivative action on behalf of XanGo against Defendants pursuant to Utah R.
Civ. P. 23.1 and Utah Code Ann. §48-2c-l70L See R.14. The Complaint alleges that
XanGo's founding members have engaged in conduct which breaches fiduciary duties
owed to the company and its minority interest holders, including mismanaging the
company's affairs, misapplying or wasting company assets, and misappropriating
company assets for their own personal benefits. R. 14 at ^j 21.
Specifically, Angel alleged in its Complaint that Defendants have taken personal
loans from the company aggregating millions of dollars, id. at ^| 14; used company funds
to acquire minority interests from other members and assigned such membership interests
to themselves, thus appropriating to themselves opportunities belonging to XanGo and all
of its members, id. at ^f 15; received increased distributions from the company based on
their increased ownership interests acquired with company funds, id. at ^ 16; used
company funds to finance large single-family residences for themselves in transactions
that are not arms-length and that have not required the controlling members to recognize
the use of such homes as income or distributions, id. at ^j 17; had exclusive use of
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company-leased automobiles without paying reasonable lease rates or recognizing the use
of the automobiles as income or distributions, id. at ^J 18; and paid themselves excessive
compensation and excessive reimbursements for alleged business expenses, id. at ^j 19.
Defendants responded by filing a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), arguing that xAngel lacks standing to
bring this derivative suit because it does not fairly and adequately represent other XanGo
shareholders who are similarly situated. See R. 18; 144. In support of this motion,
Defendants attached affidavits from themselves and thirteen other minority members, all
opposing the derivative action and asserting that Angel does not fairly and adequately
represent their interests. See R. 1447 Exhibit B. Tellingly, each of the affidavits carefully
avoids denying the specific factual allegations in the Complaint regarding Defendants'
conduct. See id. This failure to deny is especially peculiar coming from the Defendants
themselves, who would know whether they had engaged in the alleged conduct. All
nineteen affidavits contain substantively uniform statements, and representative affidavits
are attached as Addendum B.
Angel opposed this motion, arguing that the nineteen affidavits were suspect
because each of the affiants had at least one collateral reason to vouch for the Defendants,
unrelated to the merits of this lawsuit; Angel also argued that the nineteen affidavits were
irrelevant to the standing issue because none of those members was similarly situated to
Angel. R.238. Angel argued that there are no other similarly situated XanGo members,
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and thus Angel should be allowed to proceed in the derivative suit as a "class of one.11 Id.
Angel supported this argument with declarations of counsel and Stephen Bean. Id.,
Exhibits A & B (Addendum C-E).
Because no discovery had been conducted, Angel also filed an affidavit pursuant
to Utah R. Civ. P. 56(0 requesting additional time in which to conduct discovery
regarding this issue, see R.238, Exhibit D (Addendum E), as well as a motion to strike
portions of the Defendants' nineteen affidavits. See R. 147; 154. Defendants then filed a
motion to strike portions of the Bean declaration. See R.263; 270.
In its Ruling on these motions, the court granted in part and denied in part Angel's
motion to strike, striking paragraphs 2, 5, 6, and part of 8 from the nineteen affidavits; the
court also granted Defendants' motion to strike, striking paragraphs 4, 5, 6, and 7 from
the Bean declaration. R.356 at 1-4 (Addendum A). The court denied Angel's request for
additional time in which to conduct discovery, ruling that because the motion to dismiss
was filed pursuant to Elule 12(b)(1), Rule 56(0 does not apply. Id. at 3-4, 6.
The court then granted Defendants' motion to dismiss, concluding that Angel was
not a fair and adequate representative of other XanGo members as required under
Utah R. Civ. P. 23.1. Id. at 6-11. In granting the Defendants' motion, the district court
found convincing the affidavits produced by Defendants, which, according to the court,
indicated that even if the alleged malfeasance is occurring, the members prefer to allow
its continuance rather than allow XanGo to be involved in a derivative lawsuit. See id.
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The district court was clearly unhappy with this conclusion, since according to the court,
it "does not condone any malfeasance on the part of XanGo's founders," but nevertheless
could not allow a derivative suit to continue "against the will of all other similarly
situated XanGo owners." Id. at 12.
Angel now appeals dismissal of the derivative suit.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The issue in this appeal is whether Utah R. Civ. P. 23.1 is intended to prevent
derivative suits when the majority of members in a limited liability company decide that a
derivative suit should not proceed, even when those same members do not challenge the
alleged breaches of fiduciary duties owed to the company. While this issue has never
been directly decided by Utah's appellate courts, this issue is one of significant public
policy which implicates a very important aspect of corporate governance, i.e., a minority
member's ability to challenge oppressive and wrongful conduct on the part of the
majority members, regardless of how unpopular the suit may be from the perspective of
other members.
Accordingly, the district court erred in granting Defendants1 motion to dismiss
pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) for two reasons: (I) because the issue of fair and
adequate representation is a fact-sensitive inquiry, the court erred in granting the motion
without first allowing Angel time to conduct any disco very relevant to this issue; and (2)
the court erred in determining that Angel is an inadequate representative under

11

Utah R. Civ. P. 23.1, because it improperly based this determination on a hypothetical
conflict of interest and on the lack of support from purported similarly situated XanGo
members.
First, the district court erred in granting Defendants' motion to dismiss without
first allowing Angel additional time m which to conduct discovery. While the district
court correctly recognized in its Ruling that a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss is not
automatically converted into a Rule 56 motion simply because evidence outside the
pleadings is considered, the court erred in assuming that this principle foreclosed Angel's
request for time to conduct discovery. In fact, courts often allow discovery m such cases,
even when the motion to dismiss is not formally converted into a motion for summary
judgment. The need to allow discovery is particularly strong when a court is making a
determination of fair and adequate representation under Rule 23.1 because this
determination is fact-specific. No discovery had been conducted in the case at the time the
motion to dismiss was filed. Angel needed discovery in order to determine the
relationship of other minority members with the controlling members or promises or
threats that had allegedly been made to get the minority members to disagree with the
derivative action. Without a record of any kind, Angel was unable to adequately rebut the
allegations made in the Defendants' motion to dismiss and supporting affidavits. The
district court therefore erred in denying Angel's request for time to conduct discovery.
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Second, the district court erred in granting Defendants' motion to dismiss based on
its determination that Angel is not a fair and adequate representative in the derivative
action as required by Rule 23.1. The district court based its determination on two
grounds, both of which were improper grounds for dismissal of the derivative suit. The
first ground relied upon by the district court was its finding that a potential conflict
existed between Angel's interests in the Direct Lawsuit and its interests in the derivative
suit. This ground is insufficient to support the district court's Ruling because conflicts
that are merely hypothetical are insufficient to support dismissal of a derivative action.
The second ground relied upon by the district court was its finding that other XanGo
minority members were similarly situated to Angel, and, as a result, Angel could not
proceed in the derivative action without their support. This ground is also insufficient to
support the district court's Ruling because the minority members identified by the court
as similarly situated actually have ownership and economic interests which are
antagonistic to Angel's interests. Although these other minority members oppose the
derivative suit, this lack of support is irrelevant because there is the very real possibility
that in opposing Angel's efforts, these members may have been motivated by individual
interests, rather than the good of the corporation. Rule 23.1 was never intended to prevent
derivative suits simply because the other members prefer to allow the malfeasance to
continue rather than allow the company to be involved in a derivative lawsuit. As such,
Angel should therefore be allowed to proceed as a class of one.

13

For these reasons, the district court committed reversible error m granting
Defendants' motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), and this Court should reverse the
district court's Ruling of December 12, 2007.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE MOTION TO
DISMISS WITHOUT ALLOWING ANGEL ADDITIONAL TIME IN
WHICH TO CONDUCT DISCOVERY
The district court erred in granting Defendants' motion to dismiss without first

allowing Angel additional time in which to conduct discovery. Angel needed this
discovery in order to deteniime the relationship of other members to the majority interest
owners or promises or threats that had allegedly been made to get the minority members
to disagree with the derivative action. See Addendum E. Without such discovery, Angel
could not fully respond to the Defendants' motion to dismiss or adequately rebut the
supporting affidavits. The court denied Angel's Rule 56(f) motion, however, because it
concluded that Rule 56(0 w a s inapplicable to motions to dismiss based on Rule 12(b)(1).
Addendum A at 3-4, 6.
Although the district court cited no authority for this conclusion, it was apparently
relying on cases such as Wheeler v. MePherson, in which the Utah Supreme Court
explained that Rule 12 "does not convert motions based on subsections (b)(1) tlirough (5)
. .. into motions for summary judgment simply because they include some affirmative
evidence relating to the basis for the motion." 2002 UT 16, ^j 20, 40 P.3d 632 (quotation

14

omitted); see Coombs v. Juice Works Dev., Inc., 2003 UT App. 388, ffi| 7-8, 81 P.3d 769
(same).
While it may be true that motions to dismiss based on Rule 12(b)(1) are not
automatically subject to conversion to a motion for summary judgment,4 the district court
erred m assuming that this principle foreclosed Angel's request for time to conduct
discovery. It did not. In fact, in many cases involving motions to dismiss based on
subsections (b)(1) through (b)(5), discovery is appropriate and often necessary- whether
or not Rule 56(f) is the most proper label for a motion requesting such discovery.5 See,
e.g. Coombs, 2003 UT App. 388, ^ 7-8 (noting the general principle that motions based
on subsections (b)(1) through (b)(5) are not automatically converted into motions for
summary judgment simply because they include some affirmative evidence relating to the

4

Although Rule 12 conversion to a motion for summary judgment may not be
automatic, there are some circumstances in which such a conversion is justified. For
example, the court is required to convert a 12(b)(1) motion to a 12(b)(6) motion or Rule
56 motion "when resolution of the jurisdictional question is intertwined with the merits of
the case. The jurisdictional question is intertwined with the merits when subject matter
jurisdiction is dependent on the same statute that provides the basis for the substantive
claim." Pringle v. United States, 208 F.3d 1220, 1222 (10th Cir. 2000); see Robinson v.
Union Pacific R.R., 245 F.3d 1188, 1191 (10th Cir. 2001) (explaining that when the
subject matter jurisdiction is dependent upon the same statute that provides the basis for
the substantive claim, the issues of jurisdiction and the merits are "intertwined," and if the
court considers evidence outside the pleadings, the motion to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction can be converted to a motion for summary judgment).
3

The label a party uses to name its motion is not dispositive. See Canfield v.
Layton City, 2005 UT 60, \ 6 n. I, 122 P.3d 622 (stating that although the parties
consistently referred to the motion as a 12(b)(6) motion, the record made it clear that what
the court was actually being asked to review was a 12(b)(1) motion).
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basis for the motion, yet allowing the parties to submit affidavits and conduct limited
discovery on a Rule 12(b)(3) motion to dismiss); Stuart v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co.,
271 F.3d 1221, 1225 (10th Cm 2001) (explaining that a 12(b)(1) motion can go beyond
the allegations and challenge the facts upon which subject matter jurisdiction is based, the
court has discretion to "allow affidavits, other documents, and a limited evidentiary
hearing to resolve disputed jurisdictional facts") (quotation omitted).
Notably, in cases where this Court has upheld the denial of a plaintiffs discovery
request made in opposition to a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff had already
conceded the essential facts upon which the motion to dismiss was based. For example,
in Wheeler, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed both the denial of the plaintiffs' discovery
request and the Rule 12(b)(1) dismissal based on plaintiffs' failure to file a proper notice
of claim - but only after it specifically noted that the plaintiffs had conceded that they did
not direct and deliver their notices to the proper party. Wheeler, 2002 UT 16, ^ 20. This
Court concluded, Therefore, because plaintiffs admit the very facts necessary to
dispose of their suit . . ., we rule that the district court did not err by denying plaintiffs
discovery request." Id. (emphasis added).
In a similar case, where the defendant had attached affidavits to a Rule 12(b)(1)
motion demonstrating that plaintiff had not filed a notice of claim, this Court again
indicated that conversion to a Rule 56 motion was not required, not simply because the
original motion was based on Rule 12(b)(1), but because the plaintiff had openly admitted
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that she did not comply with notice of claim provisions. Spoons v. Lewis, 1999 UT 82
^1 5, 987 P.2d 36. The Utah Supreme Court concluded that under these circumstances, the
plaintiff''therefore cannot complain that the district court's treatment of the motion
prevented her from rebutting the evidence establishing her failure to comply with the
notice statute/' Id.
Without such an admission, however, and when the facts necessary to dispose of
the Rule 12(b)(1) motion are in dispute, discovery is necessary. The need to allow parties
to conduct discovery is particularly strong when the court is making a determination of
fair and adequate representation pursuant to Rule 23.1 because "[w]hether a particular
plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent the interests of other similarly situated
shareholders as required by Rule 23.1 turns upon the total facts and circumstances of
each case." Rothenberg v. Security Management Co., 667 F.2d 958, 961 (1 Ith Cir. 1982)
(emphasis added); see 13 Fletcher Cyc. Corp. § 5981.41 (stating that the determination of
whether a plaintiff fairly and adequately represents the interests of similarly situated
shareholders and the corporation is fact-specific).
Because of the fact-sensitive inquiry, a determination of fair and adequate
representation under Rule 23.1 requires the establishment of some kind of record. See
Hall v. Tennessee Dressed Beef Co., 957 S.W.2d 536, 540 (Tenn. 1997) ("Because there
is no evidence in the record to support a finding that [plaintiff] is incapable of fairly
representing the interests of the corporation in the derivative action while maintaining his
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individual suit, the existence of both is no reason to deny him standing/') (emphasis
added); Williams v. Service Corp. lnt\ 459 S.E.2d 621, 622 (Ga. App. 1995) (ci[T]here is
nothing in the record to indicate that [plaintiff] brought the . . . fa]ction as a mere guise
to gain control of [the company].11) (emphasis added); Neusteter v. District Court, 675
P.2d 1, 8 (Colo. 1984) (en banc) ('These assertions [regarding whether plaintiffs fairly
and adequately represent the interests of the shareholders] are not supported by any
evidence in the record . . . .") (emphasis added); cf. LeVanger v. Highland Estates
Properties Owners Assoc, 2003 UT App. 377, % 16, 80 P.3d 569 (stating that there is
"nothing in the record that suggests [defendant] ever waived the issue of standing" under
Rule 23.1) (emphasis added).
At the time the Defendants1 motion to dismiss was filed in this case, however,
there was no record As explained in the Rule 56(f) affidavit filed by Angel's counsel,
Richard J. Armstrong, no discovery had been conducted in this matter at the time the
motion to dismiss was filed, and the parties had not even had the opportunity to meet and
confer as required under Utah R. Civ. P. 26(f) to discuss a proposed case management
order or proposed discovery plan. Addendum E atffl|4-5.
Angel also submitted a declaration from Stephen Bean in response to Defendants'
motion to dismiss, see Addendum D, but without depositions or any other discovery to
support Mr. Bean's assertions and Angel's substantive arguments, Angel did not have an
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adequate opportunity to rebut the Defendants' affidavits.6 Angel therefore requested time
to conduct discovery in order to uncover evidence relating to whether Angel fairly and
adequately represents the mterests of similarly situated members of XanGo, whether there
are similarly situated members of XanGo, the percentages of ownership interests within
the company, and the basis for the testimony provided in the nineteen affidavits submitted
by Defendants in support of their motion to dismiss. Addendum E at ^flj 7, 10, 14.
Without the opportunity to conduct this discovery or to create a record of any kind,
Angel was unable to ''present by affidavit facts essential to justify" its position, nor did it
have an "adequate opportunity to rebut materials outside the pleadings.'1 Wheeler, 2002
UT 16, Tj 20. The district court therefore committed reversible error when it granted
Defendants' motion to dismiss without first allowing Angel time in which to conduct
discovery relevant to the motion to dismiss.

6

That Angel could not fully respond to the motion to dismiss without discovery is
only further supported by the fact that several portions of Stephen Bean's declaration
were struck by the district court not for problems with relevancy, but for lacking
foundation or containing inadmissible hearsay. See Addendum A at 4.
Angel submitted Mr. Bean's declaration in order to refute certain statements in the
nineteen affidavits submitted by Defendants with their motion to dismiss. Mr. Bean's
declaration was submitted largely to supplement counsel's Rule 56(f) affidavit, however,
by showing what discovery will likely uncover with regard to Angel's status as a fair and
adequate representative of XanGo's members. See Addendum D.
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II.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE MOTION TO
DISMISS BASED ON ITS DETERMINATION THAT ANGEL DID NOT
SATISFY THE "FAIR AND ADEQUATE REPRESENTATIVE"
REQUIREMENT OF RULE 23.1
The district court erred in granting Defendants' motion to dismiss based on the

determination that Angel did not satisfy the requirements of Utah R. Civ. P. 23.1 for
filing a derivative lawsuit. In their motion to dismiss; the Defendants argued that the
district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the derivative suit because
Angel lacks standing under Rule 23.1, having failed to meet the requirement that it fairly
and adequately represents the interests of other XanGo members. The district court
granted Defendants' motion to dismiss on two grounds, see Addendum A at 11, both of
which were improper grounds for dismissal of the derivative suit.
First, the district court erred in granting the motion to dismiss based on its finding
of a potential conflict between Angel's interests in the Direct Lawsuit and its interests in
the derivative suit. Second, the district court erred in granting the motion to dismiss
based on its finding that Angel is not a "class of one1' and therefore cannot proceed as a
representative plaintiff without the support of other XanGo owners. Neither of these
grounds supports the court's determination that Angel is not a fair and adequate
representative plaintiff in the derivative suit, and thus the district court erred in granting
the Defendants' motion to dismiss.
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A.

The Court Erred in Basing Its Determination on a Hypothetical
Conflict Between Vngel's Interests in the Direct Suit and its Interests in
the Derivative Suit.

The district court erred m granting the motion to dismiss based on a potential
conflict between Angel's mteiests in the Direct Lawsuit and its interests in the derivative
action In its Ruling, the court recognized that there is no per se rule prohibiting a
plaintiff m a direct suit from simultaneously representing members in a derivative suit and
acknowledged that m tins case, *[i|t is possible that the Direct Lawsuit will not decrease
[Angel's] interest in pursuing the derivative claims " Addendum A at 9 (emphasis
added) Because in the Direct Lawsuit Angel seeks dissolution of XanGo, however, the
district court found that the interests of Angel and the other non-defendant XanGo
members aie "not aligned," and "there may be some actual conflict between [Angel's]
interest m the Direct Lawsuit and is representation in the demative suit " Id (emphasis
added) This finding of a potential conflict of interest is not sufficient to support the
distuct court's Ruling
The burden is on the defendant to prove to the district court that the plaintiff is an
inadequate representative, and in this case, Defendants failed to show that Angel's
interests are "sufficiently antagonistic" to the interests of the othei members so that Angel
is not a fair and adequate representative See LeVanger v Highland Estates Properties
Owners Assoc , 2003 UT App 377, ^ 18, 80 P 3d 569 (stating that the burden is on the
defendant to show that the plaintiff is an inadequate representative under Rule 23 l),
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7C Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. 3d § 1833 (same). In order to satisfy this burden, a defendant
must show that a ^serious conflict" exists and that the plaintiff "'cannot be expected to act
in the interest of others because doing so would harm the derivative plaintiffs other
interests.^ 13 Fletcher Cyc. Coip. § 5981.42. Where, as here, the plaintiff has filed a
verified complaint containing the proper allegations as required by Rule 23.1, the
defendant must prove that the plaintiff is an inadequate representative. LeVanger, 2003
UTApp. 377,U 18, 80P.3d569.
Defendants did not satisfy this burden. Defendants presented no evidence
whatsoever of any conflict, "serious'1 or otherwise. Defendants did not even allege that
Angel's participation in the Direct Lawsuit would decrease its interest in vigorously
pursuing the derivative action, and Defendants" unsupported allegation that Angel is only
pursuing the derivative action to gain leverage against XanGo in the Direct Lawsuit was
rejected by the district court.7 See Addendum A at 9. All Defendants brought before the
district court was a general statement that each affiant was simply "aware that Angel

7

The allegation that Angel brought the derivative action only to gam leverage in
the Direct Lawsuit is not only unsupported, but actually disproved by the evidence. When
Angel changed counsel, it was recognized that the fiduciary claim in the Direct Lawsuit
should have been brought as a derivative claim. Angel's counsel therefore attempted to
obtain Defendant's consent to simply amending the Direct Lawsuit to make the change.
Defendant refused. Accordingly, after requesting that XanGo1 s board assume
responsibility for the derivative claim, and after that request was rejected, Angel filed the
separate derivative action.
AngeLs intent was always to move to consolidate these actions, but the motion to
dismiss the derivative action was filed so early in the process that Angel had not yet had
the chance to do so.
11

Investois has also bi ought lawsuit alleging duect claims against XanGo and seeking
damages from the company,' Addendum B at ^ 7 and 8 combined with the conclusory
assertion that a conflict must exist because Angel seeks both monetary damages m the
derivative suit and dissolution in the Direct Lawsuit
Such conclusory and unsupported assertions are insufficient to prove that Angel is
an inadequate representative m the derivative action See Williams v Service Corp Int /,
459 S E 2d 621, 622-623 (Ga Ct App 1995) ("The mere assertion that [the plaintiffs]
interests may have been antagonistic to [the corporation]

does not necessitate a

dismissal ") Simultaneous direct and derivative actions are permitted where the alleged
"antagonism" between the direct and derivative actions is merely a 'surface duality," In
re Transocean Tender Offer Securities Litig , 455 F Supp 999, 1014 (N D III 1978),
and derivative claims seeking monetary damages on behalf of the corporation are not
incompatible with direct claims seeking dissolution of the corporation
The case of Hall v Tennessee Dressed Beef Co , is instructive In Hall, a minority
shareholder brought a derivative action against a majority shareholder, and
simultaneously brought a direct suit asserting claims involving the majority shareholder
which included a claim against the company for judicial dissolution 9^7 S W 2d 536
(Term 1997) Siding with the plaintiff, the court in Hall held that there vv as no conflict of
interest precluding the plaintiff from asserting both the direct claim against the company
for dissolution and the derivative claim against the majority shareholder Id at 540
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The Coloiado Supreme Court offered another perspective and explained,
^Derivative claims aie not brought by good Samaritans concerned lor the welfare of
corporations, they are biought by shareholders seeking to piotect their investments
There is no contradiction between plaintiffs ^ request for restoration of corporate assets
and their concunent application for dissolution because ot the prospect of continued
mismanagement ot the corporation, both remedies are directed at protection of their
investments " Neusteter v District Court, 675 P 2d 1,8 (Colo 1984) (en banc)
While no Utah cases have explicitly held that a plaintiff can simultaneously bring
both a derivative and a duect action, Utah courts have obv lously assumed in prior cases
that theie is nothing inconsistent in doing so For example, m GLFP Ltd v CL Mgmt
Ltd , the Utah Court of Appeals explained that actions alleging mismanagement, breach
of fiduciary duties and appropriation or waste of corporate opportunitres and assets
generally belong to the corporation, and a shareholder must bi mg such actions on its
behalf

2007 Ul App 131,^8-9, 12-15, 163 P 3d 636 While the court did not analyze

the specific question ot whether the plaintiff fairly and adequately represented interests ot
other shareholders undei Rule 23 I, the court clearly indicated that a derivative claim for
breach of fiduciary duty can co-exist with a direct claim by the same plamtiff for judicial
dissolution Id at ^] 7-11, 12-15 (contrasting a shareholder s denvativ e claim on behalf
of the cotporation and a direct claim for injury to the shareholder, not the corporation, and
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concluding that the plaintiffs allegations set forth a sufficient basis-separate and apart
from the derivative claims-for seeking judicial dissolution).
Here, the relief sought m this derivative action is not incompatible or inconsistent
with the relief being sought by Angel in the Direct Lawsuit. If Angel proves XanGo's
breach of fiduciary claim in this case, the individual Defendants will have to pay damages
to XanGo and those damages would then be paid out to all members in the "winding up"
of the company after dissolution. See Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-l30l (winding up of a
dissolved company consists of "collecting all amounts owed to the company . . . and
distributing all remaining company assets and property among the members of the
company according to their interests")- Angel's derivative claim seeks relief which will
benefit the company, and therefore all members. Similarly, Angel's Direct Lawsuit seeks
relief for oppression of all minority members, and the claim for dissolution, if successful,
would force a reorganization of the enterprise that would result in a fairer return for all
members.
The dissolution claim in the Direct Lawsuit, therefore, is completely compatible
with the breach of fiduciary claim in this case. Defendants failed to satisfy their burden
by showing that any conflict exists which would make Angel an inadequate representative
under Rule 23.1.
Because the Defendants failed to satisfy this burden, there was no evidence before
the district court which would have allowed it to find that an actual, serious conflict of

25

interests exists-and the court in fact made no such finding. See Vanderbilt v. Geo-Energy
Ltd., 725 F.2d 204, 207 (3d Cir. 1983) (stating that in order to dismiss a derivative
plaintiff for this reason, the court must first find that the plaintiff has interests
antagonistic to the other shareholders in the derivative action).
Rather, as indicated above, the district court only found that a potential conflict of
interest exists, finding that "there may be some actual conflict between [Angers] interest
in the Direct Lawsuit and its representation in the derivative suit," and even
acknowledging that it is "possible" that Angel's participation in the Direct Lawsuit will
not decrease its interest in pursuing the derivative claims for the benefit of all nondefendant XanGo owners. Addendum A at 9 (emphasis added). This finding is
insufficient, however, because conflicts which are merely potential or hypothetical are
insufficient to support dismissal of a derivative action. See Williams v. Service Corp.
Int'l, 459 S.E.2d 621, 622 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) ("[A] purely hypothetical dispute will not
necessitate dismissal.11); 7C Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. 3d § 1833 (same); see also In re
Transocean Tender Offer Securities Litig, 455 F. Supp. 999, 1014 (D.C. III. 1978) ("At
this stage of the proceedings there is merely a potential conflict of interest present.
Moreover, if this potential conflict should crystallize, for example, if and when the
question of remedy is reached, the court has sufficient authority to deal with any problems
that may arise.").
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Without a finding of an actual, seuous conflict arising fiom Angel's simultaneous
piosecution ol both the Direct Lawsuit and the derivative action, there is no basis for the
district court's conclusion that Angel is not a fair and adequate representative m the
derivative suit The district couit committed reversible erroi m granting Defendants
motion to dismiss on this ground
B.

The District Court Erred in Basing Its Determination on the Lack of
Support For the Derivative Action From Other XanGo Shareholders

The district court also erred in granting the motion to dismiss based on the lack of
support for the derivative action from other XanGo members The fair and adequate
representation requirement of Rule 23 I is not intended to pievent a derivative action
when the majority of members m a limited liability company oppose the derivative action
simply because they prefer to allow the alleged malfeasance to continue lather than allow
the company to be involved m a derivative lawsuit In this situation, no othet XanGo
members are similarly situated to Angel, and the court mistakenly concluded that Angel
cannot proceed m the derivative suit as a *wclass of one "
In support of their motion to dismiss, the Defendants submitted the affidavits of
nineteen XanGo members, including themselves, who opposed the derivative action See,
e g Addendum B The district court narrowed dovv n this potential class of injured
minority shareholders by eliminating from its consideration the six Defendants, the seven
XanGo employees, and the two family members of Defendants who submitted affidav its
See Addendum A. at 10-11 That left foui affiants
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the Bederra Group, the Genesis

Group, and the Grimmers - who the district court determined to be similarly situated to
Angel because any benefit conferred through the derivative suit would be shared by all
XanGo members. Id. at 7, 11. The court therefore concluded that Angel could not
maintain the derivative action as a "class of one11 because it would not "receive a separate
or distinct benefit by prevailing in the derivative action/' Id. at 7.
The district court erred in reaching this conclusion, however, because no other
XanGo members are similarly situated to Angel, including the four members identified by
the district court. In particular, the court erred in its definition of the similarly situated
class of members. The similarity of benefits which could be received in a successful
derivative action is not the proper criteria for determining whether shareholders are
similarly situated; rather, the determination is more often based on the characteristics of
the shareholders' ownership interests and relationships with the defendants.8 When these
characteristics indicate that the other minority shareholders are not likely to act in the best
interests of the corporation, the courts consistently allow the plaintiff to proceed in the
derivative action as a legitimate class of one.

8

Even the district court seemed to implicitly recognize this principle when it
eliminated from its consideration any affidavits filed by the Defendants, relatives of the
Defendants, or employees of XanGo. See Addendum A at 11 (refusing to consider
affidavits of affiants who "have an employee or family relationship to the Defendants or
the company of which the Defendants are the majority owners"). The affiants who were
excluded from consideration as possible similarly situated members were necessarily
excluded because of their ownership interests and relationships with the defendants.
28

For example, in Jordan v. Bowman Apple Prods. Co., the plaintiff was one of four
shareholders in a closely held corporation and alleged that the defendant, a principal of
the company, improperly conducted the affairs of the company so as to ^squeeze out" the
plaintiff and obtam her interest in the company for less than it was worth. 728 F. Supp.
409 (W.D Va. 1990). The defendant challenged the plaintiffs standing as a fair and
adequate representative of similarly situated shareholders. Id. at 413. In rejecting that
challenge, the court found that the plaintiff was a legitimate class of one because she was
the only shareholder who had not entered into a voting-trust agreement which had pooled
the voting control of the other shareholders and gave voting control of the stock to the
corporate president. Id. ("Clearly important in a case such as this, where mismanagement
and oppression are alleged, is the existence of any stock voting arrangement which alters
the power structure of the corporation from that which appears on the face of a list of
percentage ownership.").
And, in Larson v. Dumke, the court concluded that the plaintiff was not similarly
situated with other shareholders where each non-defendant shareholder had an economic
interest in supporting the current management. 900 F.2d 1363, 1368 (9th Cir. 1990).
Because of this shared economic interest with the defendants, the court concluded that
"[tjhere is the very real possibility that in refusing to join with or in actively opposing [the
plaintiffs] efforts, the non-defendant shareholders may have been motivated by
individual interests, rather than the good of the corporation.11 Id.
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Similarly, each of the four XanGo members identified by the court as similarly
situated has some economic interest in supporting the current management of XanGo, and
at least three of the four have signed the 2005 Amended and Restated Operating
Agreement (''Amended Operating Agreement"), which Angel opposes and has not signed.
The Bederra Group has signed the Amended Operating Agreement and has an economic
interest in supporting the Defendants as one of XanGo's vendors. R.238 at 7-8. The
Grimmers have similarly signed the Amended Operating Agreement and also have an
economic interest in supporting the Defendants as Class B Share Owners under the
Amended Operating Agreement, which gives them a board position and special status
with some management control. Id.
While Genesis Group has allegedly not signed the 2005 Amended and Restated
Operating Agreement, it is not similarly situated to Angel because it has indicated its
desire, along with the other minority owners, to allow the misfeasance in the company to
continue in perpetuity. Genesis Group was once a supporter of Angels1 efforts and
actually helped finance the Direct Lawsuit before being threatened by XanGo. R.211-12,
1fl|6-7. The two principals of Genesis Group, Hugh Biesinger and Mike Mansfield,
expressly asked Angel, before the derivative and direct actions were filed, to proceed with
the Direct Lawsuit as it was a direct benefit to them. R.212, \6. They also asked that
their involvement in financing and drafting the complaint be kept confidential from
XanGo as they were worried it would ruin their opportunity to sell their shares back to the
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company R 211-12 ^[6 Genesis Group apparently changed its mind w ith regard to the
derivative action and the Direct Lawsuit when it signed an affidavit stating that it did not
agree with the legal actions being taken by Angel Angel was prevented from exploring
through discovery Genesis' reasons for now disagreeing with the actions Angel has taken
to enforce its minority interests Angel should have been given the chance to conduct
discovery on these material facts
Angel is unique because of its continued opposition to the Amended Operating
Agreement, because it alone has no economic interest in supporting the Defendants or
current XanGo management, and because it alone wants to put a stop to management's
malfeasance Angel alleges, among other things, that the Defendants attempted to use the
Amended Operating Agreement to oppress Angel and coax it into submission with the
Defendants' demands Thus, Angel is a class of one and is therefore an adequate
representative pursuant to Rule 23 I
In the end, whether other minority XanGo members support the derivative suit is
irrelevant because "the lack of support for the derivative suit, m and of itself, does not
indicate that [the plaintiff] is an inadequate representative " Larson, 900 F 2d at 1368 [n
a case that is strikingly similar to this case, a plaintiff was allowed to proceed as a class of
one even though all of the other minority shareholders m the closely held corporation
disavowed the plaintiffs derivative action based on waste, fraud, and breach of fiduciary
duty, and stated that they were content with the salaries being paid to the directors and
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majority shareholders. Brandon v. Brandon Constr. Co., 116 S.W.2d 349, 351, 353 (Ark.
1989). The court m that case concluded that cc[a]lthough the other minority shareholders
have disavowed the action of the [plaintiff] and indicated they do not wish to continue the
action, she is not prohibited from doing so." Id.; see also Eye Site Inc. v. Blackburn, 79
S.W.2d 160, 162 (Texas 1990) (finding that there could be a legitimate "class of one"
under Rule 23.1 where a sole dissenting shareholder of a closely held corporation brought
a derivative action against the other shareholders).
In such cases, ";[t]he mere fact that the other shareholders were willing to go along
with a violation of the rights of the corporation did not foreclose the [plaintiff] from
maintaining her action," Brandon, 776 N.W.2d at 352, and the courts were "particularly
persuaded" by the fact that a contrary rule would leave the plaintiff and the coiporation
without a remedy for the defendants1 alleged misconduct. Eye Site, Inc., 796 S.W.2d at
162.
Such is the case here. All of the other XanGo members, including the four
identified by the court as similarly situated, seem willing to go along with the violation of
XanGo's rights. Nevertheless, this should not foreclose Angel from bringing the
derivative action on behalf of the coiporation. If Angel is precluded from representing
XanGo in the derivative action, XanGo would be left without a remedy for the
Defendants1 alleged misconduct.
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Angel sits in a unique position in this case because it is the only proper
representative of minority members to prosecute this action, and it should therefore be
allowed to proceed as a "class of one." The district court erred in determining that Angel
is not a fair and adequate representative in the derivative action and committed reversible
error in granting the motion to dismiss on this ground.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the District Court's Order
granting Appellees' motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1).
DATED this 1 Ith day of June, 2008.
WOOD CRAPO LLC
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ADDENDUM A

F!LED
Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County State of Utah

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ANGEL INVESTORS, LLC, a Utah limited
liability company, suing derivatively on behalf of
XanGo, LLC,

RULING RE: PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO
STRIKE PARAGRAPHS 2 AND 5-9 OF
AFFIDAVITS; DEFENDANTS' MOTION
TO STRIKJE PARAGRAPHS 4-7 OF THE
DECLARATION OF STEPHEN BEAN; AND
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS
DERIVATIVE SUIT

Plaintiff,
v.
AARON GARRITY, BRYAN DAVIS, GARY
HOLLISTER, GORDON MORTON, JOSEPH
MORTON, and KENT WOOD,

Case No. 070401904
Judge Fred D. Howard

Defendants.

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Paragraphs 2 and 5 through 9
of Affidavits; Defendants1 Motion to Strike All or Portions of Paragraphs 4, 5, 6, and 7 of the
Declaration of Stephen Bean; and Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Derivative Suit. The motions are
fully briefed and the Court heard oral argument on October 29, 2007.
Having read the pleadings, being fully advised in the premises, and good cause appearing, the
Court now makes the following Ruling:
RULING
Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Paragraphs 2 and 5 through 9 of Affidavits
Plaintiff asks the Court to strike paragraphs two and five through nine of the affidavits of nondefendants Justin Banner; Bederra Group, LLC; Nathan Brown; Bryan B. Davis; John Digles; Aaron

1

Ganit), Genesis Resouice De\elopment, LLC ("Genesis"), Dee Grimmer, Dennis Glimmer, Craig
Hale, Gary Holhstei, Joe Morton, Gordon Morton Chi is Peteison, Sean Poyntei, Lance Schiffman,
Robert Spanglei, Marc Walkei, and Kent Wood The affidavits contain unitoim statements
Defendants concede that paragiaph two should be stncken as a legal conclusion Howevei, Defendants
assert that the lemainder oi the paragiaphs aie appropriate testimony and should not be stricken
"[A]ffidauts shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be
admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matteis
stated therein " Utah R Ci\ P 56(e) While Rule 56 relates specifically to motions foi summary
judgment, affidavit testimony must comply with the lules of evidence to be admissible under any
circumstances
The Court strikes paragiaph two because it is a legal conclusion as conceded by Defendants
The Court also stakes paragiaphs fi\e and six, finding that they lack foundation

Utah R

Evidence 602 Without foundation, in testifying that the witnesses aie unaware of facts which would
support the complaint, the paiagraphs suggest that the witnesses have not leviewed documents 01 facts
other than the venfied complaint This places the w ltnesses in the position of being incompetent to
testify as to whether oi not the complaint is supportable b> documents and lelevant facts
The Court will not stake paragraph seven The opinion of the witnesses as to the propriety of
the lawsuit should be lationalh based The tact that they know something about the lawsuit may be a
basis for an expression that the) oppose the lawsuit However, they failed to state facts or piovide
testimonv as to how thev come to the conclusion that the denvative action is not in then interests
Should the> be educated as to such additional lacts the) might diaw a different conclusion This,

however, is a question of weight The Court will let the statements stand, but recognizes that such
statements aie made without describing the amount of knowledge they have concerning the conduct of
the Defendants

Noting this, the witnesses have given a statement of then general position regarding the

continuation of the lawsuit
The couit stnkes paragraph eight in part The Court will leave statements that the witnesses are
awaie of a sepaiate lawsuit biought alleging direct claims by the same lawyeis The Court will strike
the reference that the witnesses know of one and perhaps two members of Angel Investors, LLC who
have invested in a competitor, since the statement is without foundation Id
The Couit will not strike paragraph nine It is a permissible statement of the witnesses regarding
then view as to the propriety of the lawsuit However, similar to paragraph seven, the statement is an
expression without information legarding whethei 01 not it is a considered conclusion based on a review
of the foundeis' conduct The Court tecognizes the statement in that light
Defendants' Motion to Strike Paragraphs 4-7 of the Declaration ot Stephen Bean
Defendants move to strike portions of Stephen Bean's affidavit, asserting that the paragraphs are
irrelevant, are not based on personal knowledge, and contain heaisay Plaintiff asseits that Mi Bean's
statements are based on peisonal know ledge and are not hearsay, because they are offeied for the
purpose of impeachment lather than for their truth In addition, Plaintiff asserts that the statements
should be consideied m the light of Plaintiffs rule 56(f) affida\ it of counsel as good faith statements as
to what is expected to be uncoveied thiough discovery
The Court fust concludes that Rule 56(f) does not apply Defendants have not made a Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss based on failuie to state a cause of action foi which relief can be gi anted
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Instead Defendants hav e based their motion to dismiss on Rule 12(b)(1), which is not subject to
conversion to a motion foi summary judgment Rule 56(f) is only applicable to motions for summary
judgment
The Court strikes paiagiaphs tour through se\en ot Mr Bean's declaration Paragraph four
contains speculation and lacks foundation demonstrating peisonal know ledge Utah R E\ idence 602
Paragraph five lacks foundation and contains inele\ant information

Id at 402, 602 Mr Bean's

personal knowledge regarding Genesis' support of Plaintiffs direct claims against XanGo does not
pro\ ide him with a basts to state that Genesis affidavit opposing Plamtilf s derivative suit is
"incorrect " Paragiaphs six and seven both contain inadmissible hearsay, Plaintiffs assertion that the
statements are offered for impeachment purposes does not altei then status as inadmissible hearsay
offeied for then tiuth Id at 801, 802
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Derivative Suit
Defendants mo\e to dismiss this suit under Rule 23 1, aiguing that the Court does not have
subject matter jurisdiction because Plaintiff lacks standing, having failed to meet the requirements for
filing a derivative lawsuit See Utah R Civ P 21 1 Deiendants assert that the suit should be dismissed
because although Plaintiff owns 1% of XanGo Plaintiff is not a membei of XanGo and Plaintiff does
not faulv and adequately represent the interests of XanGo s members Defendants argue that 1) Plaintiff
is not a member, having failed to sign the XanGo operating agieement 2) one or more of Plaintiff Angel
Investors, LLC's ("Angel") members maintains an ownership inteiest in an entity that competes directly
with XanGo 3) Plaintiff is currently puisumg a dnect lawsuit against XanGo seeking money damages
and dissolution of XanGo ( the Duett Lawsuit ) 4) Plaintiffs puipose m filing the derivative suit is to
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acquire leverage against XanGo; and 5) the nineteen separate individual entities who represent the
remaining 99% ownership of XanGo have provided sworn affidavits by which they oppose Plaintiffs
representation in the derivative suit.
Plaintiff asserts that Defendants' arguments are not appropriate in a motion to dismiss and that
the Court should not consider the arguments until discoveiy is completed. Plaintiff also asserts that it is
a member of XanGo and that this suit is in the best interest of all non-defendant members of XanGo.
Plaintiff argues that neither its direct lawsuit against XanGo nor the fact that members of Angel may
have ownership interest in a competitor of XanGo creates a conflict of interest that prevents Plaintiff
from proceeding in this derivative lawsuit. Plaintiff asserts that it fairly and adequately represents the
interests the interests of XanGo's members. While Defendants have provided affidavits of the other
members stating opposition to the derivative lawsuit, Plaintiff asserts that those affidavits are from the
controlling members or from entities which are vulnerable to coercion by the controlling members. In
the alternative, Plaintiff argues that it is the only minority member "which is not in a position to be
coerced or bribed by the Defendants," and should therefore be allowed to proceed as a class of one.
Opposition at iii.
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1 permits cta derivative action [to be] brought by one or more
shareholders or members to enforce a right of a corporation or of an unincorporated association . . . .
The Rule further states that k'[t]he derivative action may not be maintained if it appears that the plaintiff
does not fairly and adequately represent the interests of the shareholders or members similarly situated
in enforcing the right of the corporation or association." Rule 23.1 requires a court to dismiss a
derivative action if the court finds the Plaintiff does not meet the Rule's requirements See LeVanger v.
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Highland Estates Props. Owners Ass'n, 2003 UT App. 377, ^ 18, 80 P.3d 569.
Because Plaintiffs pleadings allege that Plaintiff fairly and adequately represents the interests of
the other members, "the burden is on the defendant to show that the plaintiff is an inadequate
representative under rule 23.1 . . . and, therefore, does not have standing." Id. at ^ 18. The determination
of whether a party has standing "is primarily a question of law, although there may be factual findings
that bear on the issue." Id. at ^[ 8. A motion under 12(b)(1) must be made before further pleading.
Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b). The Court finds that it is appropriate to address Defendants' motion at this time
and finds that Plaintiffs Rule 56(f) motion does not apply, because Defendants1 motion is not based on
Rule 12(b)(6) or Rule 56.
Defendants first argue that dismissal is appropriate because Plaintiff is not a member of XanGo.
On October 22, 2007 in the Direct Lawsuit, the Court mled from the bench that there are factual issues
regarding whether Plaintiff is a member of XanGo. See Utah Fourth District Court, case no.
060402848. The parties have not presented additional information or argument in this case that
persuades the Court to alter its findings in the Direct Lawsuit. Therefore, the Court will not grant
Defendants' motion to dismiss based on their argument that Plaintiff is not a member of XanGo.
Defendants next argue that Plaintiff does not fairly and adequately represent the interests of the
other non-defendant owners of XanGo. Plaintiff first asserts that it is a class of one and can therefore
continue in the derivative suit even if the Court finds it is not an adequate representative of the other
non-defendant XanGo owners. In support of this argument, Plaintiff asserts that six affiants, the
founding or controlling members, represent 86% of XanGo's ownership; one affiant, Genesis,
previously concurred with Plaintiff; and two members have special status giving them management
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contiol While courts have allowed derivative lawsuits to proceed based on a finding that the Plaintiff is
a class of one, the Court finds that Plaintiff in this case is not a class of one See Hall v Tennessee
Dressed Beef Co , 957 S W 2d ^36, 540 (lenn 1997) (a single shareholder may maintain a derivative
action when it is the only shareholder "similarly situated") Any benefit conferred through the
derivative lawsuit would be shared by all of the XanGo members based on their percentage of
ownership, Plaintiff would not receive a separate or distinct benefit by prevailing in the deuvative
action In addition, Plaintiff is not the only owner who has not signed the operating agreement, Genesis
has not signed the operating agreement and is therefore in the same position as Plaintiff in that regard
The Couit finds that other non-defendant XanGo owners are similarly situated Therefore, Plaintiff may
not maintain the deuvative suit as a class of one
Having determined that Plaintiff may not proceed as a class of one, the Court will theiefore
considei whether Plaintiff is a fan and adequate repiesentative of the othei non-defendant XanGo
owners Courts have consideied vaiious factots m determining whether a paity faulv and adequately
represents other members in a derivative lawsuit These factors include
economic antagonisms between representative and class, the remedy sought by plaintiff
in the derivative action indications that the named plaintiff was not the dnv ing fotce
behind the litigation, plaintiffs unfamiharity wrth the litigation, other litigation pending
between the plaintiff and defendants, the lelative magnitude of plaintiffs personal
interests as compared to his interest in the derivative action itself, plaintiffs
vindictiveness towaid the defendants, and, finally, the degree of support plaintiff was
receiving from the shareholder he purported to repiesent
Davis v Corned, Inc , 619 P 2d 588, 594 (6th Cir 1980) Consideration of one or mote factots may lead
the court to detetmme that' outside entanglements

render it likely that the representative may

disiegard the interests oi the class members" oi othei wise determine that the plaintiff would not be a fair
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and adequate representative ot the other members. Id. at 593, citing Blum v. Morgan Guaranty Trust
Co. of New York, 539 F.2d 1388, 1390 (5th Cir. 1976) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Several of the factors are not in dispute in this case. Neither party asserts that an entity other
than Plaintiff is the driving force behind this litigation, nor does either party suggest that Plaintiff or
Plaintiffs attorneys are unfamiliar with this litigation. Wliile Defendants may disagree with the remedy
Plaintiff seeks, they have not alleged that the remedy sought is inappropriate.
Defendants assert that Plaintiff has a conflict of interest because members of Angel have an
interest in a company that competes with XanGo. The parties have not provided the Court with any
information regarding the type of business in which Angel's members may have an interest, the extent
of their interests, or the extent of the competition between XanGo and the other business. While interest
in competing companies may prevent a plaintiff from being a representative in a derivative lawsuit, the
Court cannot find that to be the case here based on the current record. The Court is unpersuaded by
Defendants' arguments that ownership of an unnamed owner of Angels in an unnamed competitor
constitutes a conflict of interest sufficient to bar representation. There is insufficient information
regarding the outside interests to determine that Plaintiff "may disregard the interests of the class
members" based on those interests. Id.
In addition, Defendants argue that Plaintiff is not a fair and adequate representative because it is
currently seeking money damages and dissolution in the Direct Lawsuit against XanGo. Members do
have a "right to bring direct and derivative actions simultaneously" although they always create a
"theoretical conflict of interest." In re Transocean Tender Offer Securities Litigation, 455 F.Supp 999,
1014 (D.C.I11. 1978). Despite the potential conflict of interest, there is no "per se rule" prohibiting a

plaintiff in a direct suit from simultaneousl) representing membeis in a derivative suit Id If only a
potential conflict is present, the cases ma> both proceed, the Court may take appropriate action if an
actual conflict arises Id Some couits ha\e only allowed a derivative suit to continue in addition to a
direct suit if the plaintiff is only representing itself m the derivative suit See Hall v Tenness Dressed
BeefCo, 957 S W 2d 536 (Tenn 1997), Outen v Micaf 454 S E 2d 883 (N C Ct App 1995)
However, other courts have allowed derivative representation to continue even when the plaintiff
lepresents the interests of other ovvneis See Transocean, 455 F Supp at 1014, Bertozzi v King Louie
International, Inc , 420 F Supp 1166, 1180 (D R I 1976)
In this case, the Plaintiffs direct action seeks dissolution of XanGo It is possible that the Direct
Lawsuit will not decrease Plaintiffs interest in pui suing the derivative claims for the benefit of all nondefendant XanGo owners because any distribution to Plaintiff upon dissolution would be increased if
Plaintiff is successful in the denvative suit However, the interests of Plaintiff and the other nondefendant owners aie not aligned legaidmg the Dnect Lawsuit The Court finds that theie may be some
actual conflict between Plaintiffs interest in the Direct Lawsuit and its representation in the derivative
suit

Defendants argue Plaintiff is pursuing the derivative lawsuit foi the purpose of gaining leverage
against XanGo in the Direct Lawsuit Plaintiff argues that its motive is simply to bring funds back into
XanGo that have been removed thiough malfeasance The Court will not make a finding regarding
Plaintiffs motives based merely on the allegations of the parties
Defendants assert that Plaintiff is not an adequate lepresentative because all XanGo ovvneis
excepting Plaintiff have asserted b) affidavit that the) oppose the suit and Plaintiffs lepiesentation
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Plaintiff argues that the nineteen owner affidavits do not prove Plaintiff is an inadequate representative
and that the derivative action is in the best interest of all owners which have not committed malfeasance.
In addition Plaintiff asserts that the affidavits are an inaccurate representation of the other owners'
positions regarding this action, because the other owners are all affected by the controlling members and
that there is evidence of coercion. Whether or not Plaintiffs allegations are true, the Court finds that the
other owners of XanGo are independent actors and have the ability and right to take a position that may
be against their best interests.
In Nolen v. Shaw-Walker Co. the trial court determined that plaintiff was not a fair and adequate
representative when "79 of the 84 stockholders representing 94% of the stockholders and 96% of the
outstanding stock'1 indicated to the court that they did not believe that plaintiff was a fair and adequate
representative. 449 F.2d 506, 508 (6th Cir. 1971). The appellate court upheld the court's decision, but
on other grounds. Id. Without deciding the question, the appellate court stated regarding the
stockholder's lack of support,
A quantitative requirement would be particularly difficult to apply in this case since it
is not clear with reference to the derivative (i. e. the corporation's) cause of action
which shareholders should be considered "similarly situated" or which "interests" of the
shareholders must be protected. Those who opposed the suit hold approximately 96%
of the Company's outstanding shares; but they may be considered in three separate
categories: (1) the defendants; (2) employees of the Company; and (3) the principal
defendant's two sisters and their children and related trusts.
Id. at n. 4. However, in Kuzmickey v. Dunmore Corp., the court dismissed a derivative suit, finding that
plaintiff was not a fair and adequate representative when the individual defendants who jointly owned
70% of the corporation asserted "that plaintiffs interests are obviously antagonistic to theirs and . . .
submitted affidavits of the remaining six shareholders each of whom contends that the plaintiff does not
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represent their interest and, that the suit is not brought in the best interest of the corporation.") 420 F.
Supp. 226, 230 (D. Pa. 1976).
In this case, the evidence before the court shows that six of the nineteen affiants are the
Defendants and two have a family relationship with a Defendant. As of September 30, 2006, the
Defendants owned 86.1% of XanGo. Seven other affiants are employees of XanGo. Only four of the
affiants do not have an employee or family relationship to the Defendants or the company of which the
Defendants are the majority owners. While Defendants, their family members, and the XanGo
employees may not be similarly situated to Plaintiff, the Court finds that the four remaining affiants are
similarly situated to Plaintiff.
Those four remaining affiants have each clearly stated that they oppose the derivative suit and
oppose Plaintiff representation. It is unclear from the affidavits exactly how much information the
affiants have regarding Defendants' alleged malfeasance, but each affiant states that they have read
Plaintiffs complaint, which includes a description of the alleged malfeasance. The affiants have clearly
determined that even if the alleged malfeasance is occurring, they prefer to allow its continuance rather
than allow XanGo to be involved in a derivative lawsuit. The Court finds these affidavits convincing
evidence that Plaintiffs interests are not aligned with the other members which are similarly situated;
the other members have clearly chosen to take a different course than Plaintiff.
Considering the Plaintiffs interest in the Direct Lawsuit and the clear lack of support from the
other similarly situated XanGo owners, the Court concludes that Defendants have met their burden of
demonstrating that Plaintiff would not be a fair and adequate representative of the non-defendant owners
in the derivative suit. Therefore, Plaintiff may not proceed as representative in the derivati\e suit.
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While the Court does not condone any malfeasance on the part XanGo's founders, it cannot allow a
derivative suit to continue against the will of all other similarly situated XanGo owners when Plaintiff is
not a distinct class of one and when Plaintiff has some conflict of interest in its representation because of
its Direct Lawsuit against XanGo.
The Court grants Defendants' motion to dismiss the derivative lawsuit. Counsel for Defendants
is directed to prepare an order consistent with this Ruling. Each party shall bear its own costs.
DATED this £/_

day of December, 2007.
BY THE COURT

IFHV,

rict Court Judge
N/

"OCM*U-u

^
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I certify that true copies of the foregoing Ruling were mailed, postage prepaid, on the
'2_1 day of December, 2007 to the following at the addresses indicated:

Mary Anne Q. Wood
Richard J. Armstrong
Wood Crapo, LLC
500 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Mark F. James
Phillip J. Russell
Hatch, James, & Dodge, PC
10 West Broadway, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Deputy Court Clerk
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ADDENDUM B

MarkF lames (5295)
HATCH FAMES &DODGF
10 West Bioadwa}, Suite 400
Salt Lake Cit), Utah 84101
Telephone (801)363-6363
Facsimile (801)363-6666
Attorneys for Aaron Garnty, Bryan Davis, Gary
Holhster, Gordon Morton Joseph Morton, and Kent Wood

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

ANGEL INVESTORS, LLC, a Utah limited
liability company, purportedly suing
denvatively on behalt of XanGo, LLC,

AFFIDAVIT OF AARON GARRITY

Plaintiff,
vs
AARON GARRITY, BRYAN DAVIS,
GARY HOLLISTER, GORDON
MORTON, JOSEPH MORTON, and KENT
WOOD,

Case No 070401904
Judge Houaid

Defendants

STATE OF UTAH

)
ss
COUNTY Of UTAH )
AARON GARRITY being first duly sworn upon oath states as follows
1

I am over twenty-years old, am competent to make this affidavit, have

knowledge of the matters stated in this affidavit, and make this affida\ it of: my own fiee
will and choice I have had the opportunity to consult with legal counsel of m} own
choosing pnot to signing this affida\it

2.

I own a minority interest in XanGo, LLC ("XanGo"). I received that

interest as one of XanGo's original founders As one of the founding Members of
XanGo, I signed the original Operating Agreement of XanGo dated September 2002, and
I have also signed the September 1, 2005 Amended and Restated Operating Agreement of
XanGo.
3.

I understand that Angel Investors, LLC ("Angel Investors") was formerly

known as XanGo VC, LLC ("XanGo VC"). In connection with a loan to XanGo, Angel
Investors or XanGo VC received a small, non-voting ownership interest in XanGo.
Angel Investors was invited to become a Member of XanGo by signing the 2005
Amended and Restated Operating Agreement of XanGo, but Angel Investors declined to
do so.
4.

I am a party to one or more confidentiality and non-disclosure agreements

where I have agreed that I will not disclose XanGo's financial and other private
information, and I believe it is very important (both to XanGo and its Members) that such
information remain confidential and private.
5.

I have reviewed the "Verified Complaint and Jury Demand* (the

"Complaint") Angel Investors, LLC ("Angel Investors") filed in the above-captioned
action. I have knowledge of the basic facts relating to the issues raised in the Complaint,
and believe that the claims set forth in the Complaint are without merit.
6.

I am not aware of any facts that support the allegations of the Complaint.

In fact, I believe my own actions, along with the actions of other members of XanGo's
management team, hav been highly effective, successful, and in the best interest of the
Company. Whether amounts paid as salary, bonuses, commissions, or other benefits, I

believe the total compensation paid to me, and to other members of XanGo's
management team, is reasonable and, if anything, below the compensation paid to
similarly situated executives. In my opinion, XanGo's success as a company is primarily
tied to the efforts of our management team.
7.

Because I believe it has no merit, I strongly oppose the lawsuit that Angel

Investors claims to have asserted derivatively on behalf of XanGo. I do not believe it is
in the interest of XanGo or in my interests as a Member of XanGo that the lawsuit
proceed.
8.

I am aware that Angel Investors has also brought a lawsuit alleging direct

claims against XanGo and seeking damages from the company. I also understand that
Angel Investors is represented in the other lawsuit by the same lawyers who have filed
the Complaint in the derivative lawsuit. Further, I am aware that at least one, and perhaps
two, of the members of Angel Investors have invested in a competitor of XanGo.
9.

Even if I believed that the allegations Angel Investors has made in the lawsuit had

merit, which I do not; even if I believed the lawsuit was in the best interests of XanGo,
which I do not; or even if I believed that the lawsuit should proceed, which I do not, in
my capacity as a Member of XanGo I do not believe Angel Investors adequately or
properly represents the interests of XanGo or the Members of XanGo. As a Member of
XanGo, I am opposed to a company comprised of individuals who have declined to sign
the Amended Operating Agreement (which all of the Members of XanGo have agreed to
as embodying the proper way to govern this company), who have asserted direct claims
against XanGo in another case (which is pending before this Court), and / or who have a
financial or other interest in a direct competitor

DATED this | Q

da\ of July, 2007

AaronG^frity

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this )ftfrvday of July 2007, by
Aaron Garrity.
CINDY BLAKE
NOTARY PUBLIC • STA TE of UTAH
13775 S 2200 W
RIVERTO^&j!I]84065
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES- 05-05-2009

NotaryTublic^'

Mark F.James (5295)
HATCH, JAMES & DODGE
10 West Broadway, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 363-6363
Facsimile: (801)363-6666
Attorneys for Aaron Garrity, Bryan Davis, Gary
Hollister, Gordon Morton, Joseph Morton, and Kent Wood

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

ANGEL INVESTORS, LLC, a Utah
limited liability company, purportedly
suing derivatively on behalf of XanGo,
LLC,

AFFIDAVIT OF HUGH BIESINGER
(On Behalf of Genesis Resource
Development, LLC)

Plaintiff,
vs.
AARON GARRITY, BRYAN DAVIS,
GARY HOLLISTER, GORDON
MORTON, JOSEPH MORTON, and
KENT WOOD,

Case No. 070401904
Judge Howard

Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH

)
:ss
COUNTY OF UTAH )
HUGH BIESINGER being first duly sworn upon oath states as follows:

1.

I am over twenty-years old, am competent to make this affidavit, have

knowledge of the matters stated in this affidavit, and make this affidavit of my own free
will and choice. I have had the opportunity to consult with legal counsel of my own
choosing prior to signing this affidavit.
2.

I am the Manager of Genesis Resource Development, LLC, a Utah limited

liability company ("Genesis"). Genesis is an owner of an interest in and asserts that it is
a member of XanGo, LLC ("XanGo")
I make this affidavit as an authorized representative and on behalf of Genesis.
3.

I understand that Angel Investors, LLC ("Angel Investors") was formerly

known as XanGo VC, LLC ("XanGo VC") I am informed and believe that Angel
Investors or XanGo VC received a small, non-voting ownership interest in XanGo.
4.

I am a party to a confidentiality and non-disclosure agreements where I

have agreed that I will not disclose XanGo's financial and other private information
shared with me on July 10, 2007, and I believe it is important (both to XanGo and its
Members and investors) that such information remain confidential and private.
5.

I have reviewed the " Verified Complaint and Jury Demand" (the

"Complaint) Angel Investors, LLC ("Angel Investors") filed in the above-captioned
action. I have had an opportunity to consider the allegations contained in the Complaint,
including asking questions about the allegations of a XanGo representative, and
reviewing any documents I requested to review I have had, and have been advised that I
will continue to have, full opportunity to conduct or perform any additional investigation
that I see fit to perform with respect to the issues raised in the Complaint.
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6.

My concern is that if Angel Investors acts as a representative of all owners

or interest holders in XanGo, confidential financial information may be shared with
parties outside of this closely held organization and that such sharing could cause damage
to XanGo and its financial status.
7.

I am aware that Angel Investors has also brought a lawsuit alleging direct

claims against XanGo and seeking damages from the company. I also understand that
Angel Investors is represented in the other lawsuit by the same lawyers who have filed
the Complaint in the derivative lawsuit. Further, I am aware that at least one, and perhaps
two, of the members of Angel Investors may have invested in a company that may be a
competitor of XanGo.
8.

I have not had enough opportunity to determine whether any of Angel's

claims have merit. However, if I believed that the allegations Angel Investors has made
in the lawsuit had merit; if I believed the lawsuit was in the best interests of XanGo, or if
I believed that a similar lawsuit should proceed, I do not believe Angel Investors
adequately or completely represents the interests of XanGo or the Members and interest
holders of XanGo. Additionally, Genesis is not convinced that it is good to have a
company comprised of individuals who have asserted direct claims against XanGo in
another case (which is pending before this Court), and / or who have a financial or other
interest in a direct competitor bringing this type of action on behalf of XanGo.

DATED this /Iff

day of July, 2007.
Genesis Resource Development, LLC, a
Utah limited liability company

f\ Bi^sitTger, Manager
SUBSCRIBED AND S W Q ^ JOl^fore me this jQ

day of July 2007, by

Hugh Biesinger, Manager of Genesis Resource Development, LLC

MMKFJAMES
Notary Pub*:
Stat* of Utah

Notary Public

My Comm, E*pfrw Feb 18 2009

tryyygy"*

|1QWBfOQdwoySU»»4
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Mark F. James (5295)
HATCH, JAMES & DODGE
10 West Broadway, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801)363-6363
Facsimile: (801)363-6666

ORIGINAL

Attorneys for Aaron Garrity, Bryan Davis, Gary
Hollister, Gordon Morton, Joseph Morton, and Kent Wood

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

ANGEL INVESTORS, LLC, a Utah limited
liability company, purportedly suing
derivatively on behalf of XanGo, LLC,

AFFIDAVIT OF DEE GRIMMER

Plaintiff
vs.
AARON GARRITY, BRYAN DAVIS, GARY
HOLLISTER, GORDON MORTON, JOSEPH
MORTON, and KENT WOOD,

Case No. 070401904
Judge Howard

Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH

)
:ss
COUNTY OF UTAH )
DEE GRIMMER being first duly sworn upon oath states as follows:
1.

I am over twenty-years old, am competent to make this affidavit, have knowledge

of the matters stated in this affidavit, and make this affidavit of my own free will and choice. I
have had the opportunity to consult with legal counsel of my own choosing prior to signing this
affidavit.

2.

I own a minority interest in XanGo, LLC ('XanGo"). I received that interest as

the result of a loan I made to XanGo, on essentially the same terms as the investment Angel
Investors, LLC received from XanGo. I became a member of XanGo by signing the September
1, 2005 Amended and Restated Operating Agreement of XanGo.
3.

I understand that Angel Investors, LLC ("Angel Investors") was formerly known

as XanGo VC, LLC ("XanGo VC"). I also understand that, in connection with a loan to XanGo,
Angel Investors or XanGo VC received a small, non-voting ownership interest in XanGo. I also
understand that Angel Investors was invited to become a Member of XanGo by signing the 2005
Amended and Restated Operating Agreement of XanGo, but has declined to do so.
4.

I am a party to one or more confidentiality and non-disclosure agreements where I

have agreed that I will not disclose XanGo's financial and other private information, and I
believe it is very important (both to XanGo and its Members) that such information remain
confidential and private.
5.

I have reviewed the ''Verified Complaint and Jury Demand" (the "Complaint")

Angel Investors filed in the above-captioned action. I have had an adequate opportunity to
consider the allegations contained in the Complaint, including asking questions about the
allegations, and reviewing any documents I requested to review. I have had, and continue to
have, foil opportunity to conduct or perfomi any additional investigation that I see fit to perform
with respect to the issues raised in the Complaint.
6.

I am not aware of facts that support the allegations of the Complaint. In fact, I

believe XanGo's management has done an excellent job of managing the company and have
acted in the best interest of the Company. Whether amounts paid to XanGo executives comes to
them as salary, bonuses, commissions, or other benefits, I do not believe the total compensation
2

paid to them is excessive or a concern. In my opinion, it would be difficult to overstate the
contribution of XanGo's executives to the success of the company.
7.

I do not support - in fact, I oppose - the lawsuit that Angel Investors claims to

have asserted derivatively on behalf of XanGo. I do not believe it is in the interest of XanGo or
in my interests as a Member of XanGo that the lawsuit proceed.
8.

I am aware that Angel Investors has also brought a lawsuit alleging direct claims

against XanGo and seeking damages from the company. I also understand that Angel Investors
is represented in the other lawsuit by the same lawyers who have filed the Complaint in the
derivative lawsuit. Further, I am aware that at least one, and perhaps two, of the members of
Angel Investors have invested in a competitor of XanGo.
9.

Even if I believed that the allegations Angel Investors has made in the lawsuit had

merit, which I do not; even if I believed the lawsuit was in the best interests of XanGo, which I
do not; or even if I believed that the lawsuit should proceed, which I do not, in my capacity as a
Member of XanGo I do not believe Angel Investors adequately or properly represents the
interests of XanGo or the Members of XanGo. As a Member of XanGo, I am opposed to a
company comprised of individuals who have declined to sign the Amended Operating
Agreement (which all of the Members of XanGo have agreed to as embodying the proper way to
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govern this company), who have asserted direct claims against XanGo in another case (which is
pending before this Court), and / or who have a financial or other interest in a direct competitor
DATED this

£t

day of July, 2007.

Dee Grimmer

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this

3L day of July 2007, by Dennis

Grimmer
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Mark F. James (5295)
HATCH, JAMES & DODGE
10 West Broadway, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801)363-6363
Facsimile: (801) 363-6666

ORIGINAL

Attorneys for Aaron Garrity, Bryan Davis, Gary
Hollister, Gordon Morton, Joseph Morton, and Kent Wood

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

ANGEL INVESTORS, LLC, a Utah limited
liability company, purportedly suing
derivatively on behalf of XanGo, LLC,

AFFIDAVIT OF LANCE SCHIFFMAN

Plaintiff,
vs.
AARON GARRITY, BRYAN DAVIS, GARY
HOLLISTER, GORDON MORTON, JOSEPH
MORTON, and KENT WOOD,

Case No. 070401904
Judge Howard

Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH

)
:ss
COUNTY OF UTAH )
LANCE SCHIFFMAN being first duly sworn upon oath states as follows:
1.

I am over twenty-years old, am competent to make this affidavit, have knowledge

of the matters stated in this affidavit, and make this affidavit of my own free will and choice. I
have had the opportunity to consult with legal counsel of my own choosing prior to signing this
affidavit.

2.

I am the Manager of Go XanGo, LLC and Mae Properties, LLC, both Utah

limited liability companies. I have owned a minority interest in XanGo, LLC ("XanGo"),
individually and am in the process of assigning that interest and the interest owned by Go
XanGo, LLC to Mae Properties, LLC and I am authorized to represent the interests of those
entities. I, or the entities referenced above, received that interest as the result of a loan I made to
XanGo, on essentially the same terms as the investment Angel Investors, LLC received from
XanGo. I, or the entities referenced above, became members of XanGo by signing the
September 1, 2005 Amended and Restated Operating Agreement of XanGo.
I make this affidavit, individually and as an authorized representative and on behalf of
Go XanGo, LLC and Mae Properties, LLC.
3.

I understand that Angel Investors, LLC ("Angel Investors") was formerly known

as XanGo VC, LLC ("XanGo VC"). I also understand that, in connection with a loan to XanGo,
Angel Investors or XanGo VC received a small, non-voting ownership interest in XanGo. I also
understand that Angel Investors was invited to become a Member of XanGo by signing the 2005
Amended and Restated Operating Agreement of XanGo, but has declined to do so.
4.

I am a party to one or more confidentiality and non-disclosure agreements where I

have agreed that I will not disclose XanGo's financial and other private information, and I
believe it is very important (both to XanGo and its Members) that such information remain
confidential and private.
5.

I have reviewed the "Verified Complaint and Jury Demand" (the "Complaint")

Angel Investors filed in the above-captioned action. I have had an adequate opportunity to
consider the allegations contained in the Complaint, including asking questions about the
allegations, and reviewing any documents I requested to review. I have had, and continue to
2

have, full opportunity to conduct or perfomi any additional investigation that I see fit to perform
with respect to the issues raised in the Complaint.
6.

I am not aware of facts that support the allegations of the Complaint. In fact, I

believe XanGo's management has done an excellent job of managing the company and have
acted in the best interest of the Company Whether amounts paid to XanGo executives comes to
them as salary, bonuses, commissions, or other benefits, I do not believe the total compensation
paid to them is excessive or a concern. In my opinion, it would be difficult to overstate the
contribution of XanGo's executives to the success of the company.
7.

I do not support - in fact, I oppose - the lawsuit that Angel Investors claims to

have asserted derivatively on behalf of XanGo. I do not believe it is in the interest of XanGo or
in my interests as a Member of XanGo that the lawsuit proceed.
8.

I am aware that Angel Investors has also brought a lawsuit alleging direct claims

against XanGo and seeking damages from the company I also understand that Angel Investors
is represented in the other lawsuit by the same lawyers who have filed the Complaint in the
derivative lawsuit. Further, I am aware that at least one, and perhaps two, of the members of
Angel Investors have invested in a competitor of XanGo.
9.

Even if I believed that the allegations Angel Investors has made in the lawsuit had

merit, which I do not; even if I believed the lawsuit was in the best interests of XanGo, which I
do not; or even if I believed that the lawsuit should proceed, which I do not, in my capacity as a
Member of XanGo I do not believe Angel Investors adequately or properly represents the
interests of XanGo or the Members of XanGo. As a Member of XanGo, I am opposed to a
company comprised of individuals who have declined to sign the Amended Operating
Agreement (which all of the Members of XanGo have agreed to as embodying the proper way to
3

govern this company), who have asserted direct claims against XanGo in another case (which is
pending before this Court), and / or who have a financial or other interest in a direct competitor
^
DATED this 7

day of July, 2007

LanceS^hiffman, individually, and on behalf of Go
XanGo, LLC, and Mae Properties, LLC, Utah
limited liability companies.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this
Schiffman.

Notary Public

p\

day of July 2007, by Lance

ADDENDUM C

WOOD CRAPO ixc
Mary Aane Q. Wood (3539)
Richard J. Armstrong (7461)
500 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 366-6060
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

ANGEL INVESTORS, LLC, a Utah
limited liability company, suing derivatively
on behalf of Xango LLC,
Plaintiffs,

]
])
])
]

v.

,

AARON GARRITY, BRYAN DAVIS, GARY
HOLLISTER, GORDON MORTON, JOSEPH
MORTON, and KENT WOOD,

;)
;
;)

Defendants.

DECLARATION OF
MARY ANNE Q. WOOD

Civil No. 070401904
Judge Fred D. Howard

]

MARY ANNE Q. WOOD declares and states as follows:
1.

I am over the age of 18 years old and am competent to testify to the

matters stated herein.
2.

Prior to filing this lawsuit, I asked counsel for Xango if they would

stipulate to the amendment of the Complaint in Angel Investors, LLC V. Xango, LLC, Civil No.

060402848, to include derivative claims against the managing members. Counsel for Xango said
they could not stipulate to an amendment of the Complaint.
I declare under criminal penalty of the State of Utah that the foregoing is true and
correct.
EXECUTED this C ^ *

d a y 0f

S.\WPDATAVP1.EAD[NG\ANGEL INVESTORS DERJVA"11VE MARY ANNE WOOD DECLARATION u T .i

August, 2007.
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ADDENDUM D

WOOD CRAPO LIC
Mary Anne Q. Wood (3530)
Richard J. Armstrong (7461)
500 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 366-6060
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

ANGEL INVESTORS, LLC, a Utah
limited liability company, suing derivatively
OH behalf of Xango LLC,
Plaintiffs,

;
])
])
]

v.

]

AARON GARR1TY, BRYAN DAVIS, GARY
HOLLISTER, GORDON MORTON,
JOSEPH MORTON, and KENT WOOD,

)
)
)

Defendants.

DECLARATION OF
STEPHEN BEAN

Civil No. 070401904
Judge Fred D. Howard

)

STEPHEN BEAN declares and states as follows:
1.
matters stated herein.

I am over the age of 18 years old and am competent to testify to the

2.

1 am familiar with most of the individuals and companies that signed

affidavits in support of Defendants' motion to dismiss, and am familiar with the family and other
affiliations these individuals have to some of the six defendants.
3.

Chris Peterson, identified in Affidavit No. 14. and Lance Schiffman,

identified in Affidavit No. 16, are both related to Aaron Garrity or his wife.
4.

More significantly, they are both among the largest distributors in the

Xango organization, probably making over $100,000 a month. As such, Aaron Garrity controls
their income because their distributor organizations are dependent upon Aaron Garrity's ability to
maintain their distributor organizations through waivers of distributor policies and piocedures and
other preferential treatment.
5.

With respect to the Affidavit of Genesis Resource Development LLC

("Genesis Group"), I know that many of the representations are incorrect. Members of the
Genesis Group consulted with Angel Investors prior to the filing of the Complaint in the direct
action They reviewed drafts of the Complaint and paid a portion of the legal fees for filing the
Complaint. They have been kept informed of the progress in both lawsuits and expressed
continual support for Angel Investors' efforts in representing the minority shares against the
company.
6.

Both Hugh Biesinger and Mike Mansfield, who are the principals behind

Genesis Group, expressly asked Angel Investors to proceed with the lawsuit as it was a direct
benefit to them. They also asked that their involvement in financing and drafting the Complaint be

2

kept confidential from Xango as they were worried it would rum their opportunity to sell thenshares back to the company.
7.

Recently, Hugh Biesinger told me that Craig Hale, General Counsel for

Xango, told the Genesis Group that their shares would not be bought back before the lawsuit with
Angel Investors was eliminated. I believe for this reason the Genesis Group was pressured into
filing the affidavit on behalf of the company.
I declare under criminal penalty of the State of Utah that the foregoing is true and
correct.
EXECUTED this (g ^ day of August, 2007.

STEPHEN BEAN

S < \ " P O A T A PLEADING ANGEL INVESTORS DERIVATIVE STEPHEN Dh \N DECLARATION *pd
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ADDENDUM E

WOOD CRAPO LLC
Mar>' Anne Q. Wood (3539)
Richard J. Armstrong (7461)
500 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 366-6060
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

ANGEL INVESTORS, LLC, a Utah
limited liability company, suing derivatively
on behalf of Xango LLC,
Plaintiffs,

;
])
])
)
]

DECLARA TION OF RICHARD J.
ARMSTRONG PURSUANT TO
RULE 56(f)

v.
AARON GARRITY, BRYAN DAVIS, GARY ;)
HOLLISTER, GORDON MORTON, JOSEPH ;
MORTON, and KENT WOOD,
;)
Defendants.

Civil No. 070401904
Judge Fred D. Howard

]

RICHARD J. ARMSTRONG, declares and states as follows:
1.

I am over 18 years of age and am competent to testify regarding the

matters set forth herein.

2.

I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the state of Utah, a member of

the law firm of Wood Crapo LLC, and one of the attorneys representing Plaintiff Angel
Investors, LLC, in the above-entitled derivative action.
3.

The verified complaint and jury demand in this case was filed on June 19,

4.

The parties have not conducted any discovery in this matter.

5.

The parties have not had the opportunity to meet and confer as required

2007.

under Utah R. Civ. P. 26(f) to discuss a proposed case management order or proposed discovery
plan.
6.

Discovery is expected to uncover important material facts regarding

Defendants' motion to dismiss.
7.

One such fact relates to the issue of whether Plaintiff fairly and adequately

represents the interests of similarly situated members of XanGo, LLC; whether there are similarly
situated members of XanGo, LLC; and the basis for the testimony provided in the 19 affidavits
submitted by Defendants in support of their motion to dismiss.
8.

Discovery is also expected to uncover important material facts regarding

the alleged misconduct of Defendants and the knowledge of that conduct by the other minority
interest owners; and whether other minority interest owners have been subjected to the same
alleged oppressive conduct to which Plaintiff has been subjected.
9.

This alleged misconduct includes Defendants' misappropriation of

corporate opportunities b\ buying minority interests with funds borrowed from the company

rather than having the company purchase the i n t - ^ t s ; the payment of excessive compensation,
benefits, and perks, including but not limited to loans for the purchase of personal homes, lavish
and unnecessary expenditures for corporate transportation, lavish and unnecessary expense
reimbursements; and skimming of commissions and similar conduct which breaches fiduciary
duties owed by the Defendants to XanGo, LLC and its minority interest holders.
10.

Related to the issue of whether there are similarly situated members of

XanGo, LLC, is the issue of percentages of ownership interests of each of the 19 affiants.
11.

As one of the counsel for Plaintiff in the direct action pending before this

Court, I have had the opportunity to view records designated as "confidential" and which relate
to the percentage of membership interests in XanGo.
12.

Based on my review of those documents, it is my understanding that the

principal shareholders of XanGo are the six defendants consisting of Gary Hollister, Aaron
Garrity, Joe Morton, Gordon Morton, Bryan Davis, and Kent Wood, whose total ownership
percentage in XanGo comprised 86.1 percent as of September 30, 2006. The remaining 13.9
percent of XanGo is owned by minority investors, whose respective ownership percentages range
from .10 percent to 3.3 percent.
13.

It is believed upon information that the total ownership of the six

defendants has increased since September 30, 2006.
14.

It is anticipated that discovery will uncover the extent of ownership within

the company, and the extent to which Plaintiff is a class of one and therefore the only fair and

3

1 ^

adequate representative of XanGo for purposes of prosecuting this derivative action against
Defendants.
15.

Plaintiffs counsel at Wood Crapo, LLC have represented direct sales

companies like XanGo for approximately a combined total of 20 years. We have also
represented minority interest holders in actions alleging breach of fiduciary duty. Moreover, our
client is well-informed on the issues in this case and is dedicated and committed to pursuing the
action to its end.
I declare under criminal penalty of the State of Utah that the foregoing is true and
correct.
EXECUTED on the 6th day of August, 2007.

S:\WPDATA\PLEADING\ANGEL INVESTORS DERIVATIVE.RULE 56F DECLARATION.wpd
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